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Airports are a major economic engine for the region that it serves. In today's fast paced 
global economy, easy access to world markets is crucial to companies seeking to expand 
and take full advantage of business opportunities. This paper will explore how changes to 
Transport Canada's air policy, from divestiture in 1994 to proposed amendments to the 
National Airports Policy in 2003, have impacted the Greater Moncton International 
Airport. An analysis of the policy reveals that while the devolution of Canada's national 
airport system to local control has been a success, the proposed amendments will 
negatively affect the way the Greater Moncton Airport Authority serves the public, 
airport users and, most importantly, the local community. 
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Canada’s air policy 
 
Canada's aviation industry, including airlines, airports and other facets are important to all parts 
of the country. Other sectors such as tourism are also vitally dependent on air transportation.  
Business and the public use air travel and air cargo as key parts of their activities. The aviation 
industry is governed by air policy established by the federal government. The senior level of 
government has the responsibility for air policy and through that instrument has the means of 
determining how this vital part of our economy and our society will perform. Government policy 
in respect to open skies, domestic air service and competition has been equally important. 
 
In economic development terms, an airport is a major economic engine for the region that it 
serves. In today's fast paced global economy, easy access to world markets is crucial to 
companies seeking to expand and take full advantage of business opportunities. Airports with 
adequate passenger and cargo airline services facilitate that accessibility. 
 
In this paper I will explore how changes to Transport Canada's air policy, from divestiture in 
1994 to proposed amendments to the National Airports Policy in 2003, have impacted the 
Greater Moncton International Airport.  
 




The national airports system 
 
The National Airports System (NAS) comprises 26 airports in provincial capitals and major 
centres across Canada. Together, NAS airports handle 95 per cent of passenger and 98 per cent 
of cargo traffic in Canada. The National Airports Policy of 1994 established the framework for 
providing greater local control of NAS airports to local Airport Authorities. 
 
In 1994, a new National Airports Policy called for the commercialization of federally operated 
airports. Under the policy, the management and development of the 26 National Airports System 
airports would be transferred to local Canadian Airport Authorities, who would operate under a 
ground-lease arrangement. That is, they would lease the land and the buildings but own the 
chattels.  Conversely, very small airports were given to the communities in which they were 
located lock, stock and barrel. 
 
While no longer operating these NAS airports, Transport Canada would continue to provide 
safety and security through aviation regulation and airport certification.   
 
With 726 airports in the country, 150 of which were operated or subsidized by Transport Canada, 
the unofficial objective of the exercise was to save government money. Officially, the purpose of 
creating locally based airport authorities was to allow communities to take greater control of 
their airports, reduce costs, attract new and different types of businesses, improve airport 
facilities and enhance air services to their communities. In other words to provide airports that 
were 'safe, commercially viable and cost effective'. Certainly, the expectations of these 
communities were that their airports were to become economic generators for their regions. 
However, the initial reality for the majority of these newly created airport authorities was that 
they assumed control of old infrastructures and large operating deficits. 
 
Divestiture to greater Moncton 
 
In New Brunswick, there were seven airports at the time of divestiture.  Moncton, Saint John and 
Fredericton airports were owned and operated by Transport Canada. The Moncton airport was 
one of the first to consider establishing a local airport authority. 
 
In 1988, when the Mulroney government first announced its intention to transfer federally run 
airports to local authorities, the Transportation Committee of the Greater Moncton Chamber of 
Commerce established a task force to investigate the process. There was a firm belief that the 
Moncton airport would drive future economic development within the region. Greater Moncton, 
as the geographic centre of the Maritimes, had a long history as the transportation and 
distribution hub for both road and rail. However, with the closing of the CN shops in 1988 and 
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the loss of over 2,000 well-paying jobs, the region's importance as a railway hub was clearly in 
decline and the development of the airport became even more crucial. 
 
Due to its location at the geographic centre of the Maritimes, the Moncton airport had the 
potential to develop as ‘the’ airport of the region. Within a two-hour catchment area (customers 
within a two-hour drive) the airport had 1.2 million potential customers. The Halifax 
International Airport had just 650,000 within a two-hour catchment area. The Chamber's task 
force was disbanded however, when eight months later, Transport Canada decided to start the 
transfer process with Canada's Tier 1 airports. Tier 1 airports are classified as those having 1 
million or more passengers annually. Montreal, Calgary, Edmonton and Vancouver were quickly 
transferred and became profitable under local management. 
 
When the 1994 Transportation Act took force, allowing for the transfer of Tier II airports 
(airports having 200,000 passengers or more annually, or that are provincial capitals), it was 
clear that Transport Canada did not have a vision for the Moncton area. During the 1970s, 
Transport Canada and Air Canada had invested heavily into the Halifax airport. Moncton was 
not considered a hub and was therefore relegated to feeder status when it came to capital 
investments. It was therefore imperative that the community get control of the airport, otherwise 
it would simply continue to provide feeder service to Halifax or at worse, the airport would go 
into decline and eventually fail.    
 
The Chamber's Transportation Committee reinstated the Airport Task Force, which was 
responsible for setting up the parameters for the Airport Transfer Committee. Bill Whalen, CEO 
of the Greater Moncton Chamber of Commerce during the initial period of investigation in 1989, 
was elected chair of the transfer committee with the mandate to begin the negotiations.  At that 
time, $250, 000 in seed money was obtained from the National Bank with a note signed by 
Dieppe, Moncton and Riverview - the three municipalities served by the airport. 
 
The airport authority also received support from Frank McKenna, then Premier of the province. 
He understood the importance of the Moncton airport to the region and the province as a whole. 
In his view, Saint John had its port; Fredericton was a capital city and university town; Moncton 
was the transportation hub of the province. With a much larger catchment area than Halifax 
Airport, Moncton Airport's potential was unrivalled in the province of New Brunswick.   
 
Due to the work done in the late 1980s, there was a lot of basic understanding of the transfer 
process. However, there was no real blueprint and the Greater Moncton Airport Authority was 
often very frustrated in its dealings with Transport Canada. Again, because of the latter's 
investments into Halifax Airport, it was felt that Transport Canada did not 'give a damn' about 
Moncton. 
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The deal that was on the table did not seem fair. It included the reconstruction of runway 06/24, 
the purchase of the rolling stock (e.g. snow plows), as well as other equipment that, for a price of 
$2,181,855, which was considered highly overvalued. The terminal building, which was built in 
1953, was too small and too expensive to operate ($202,000 per year in utilities alone) and 
subject to code violations that would have to be addressed immediately upon transfer. However, 
despite these discouraging facts, the community felt it was important to get off the mark first and 
take advantage of an estimated one-year window of opportunity.    
 
When the airport transfer was completed on September 1, 1997, the Airport Authority was faced 
with a deal that imposed many challenges. Among others, it had inherited a $2 million per year 
operating deficit, which immediately created an unfair playing field between it (GMAA) and its 
counterparts throughout Atlantic Canada. As predicted, one month after the transfer of the airport 
to local authority, a number of agencies sent their inspectors to the Moncton Airport and several 
code violations were cited.  Plumbing, electrical and construction codes were out of date. It was 
estimated that the cost to bring the terminal building up to code or to complete major renovations 
would be in excess of $2 million. 
 
While Transport Canada provided the GMAA with $5.8 million at time of transfer ($1 Million 
for Operations and Maintenance, $2.4 Million for capital equipment and $2.0 million towards a 
$6.8 million runway project), the latter was tied to a time frame of two years. Runway 06/24, 
sometimes known as the bad weather runway, needed to be rebuilt. The cost was estimated at 
$6.8 million.  This meant that in order to access the $2 million from Transport Canada, the 
GMAA would be obliged to borrow the remainder, adding another $4.8 million to its debt. In 
addition, by 2005, $2.1 Million would be owing for chattels. 
 
The transfer team understood that if the runway work could not be completed, the airport would 
have to degrade to one runway, eliminate its passenger services and stick to cargo. This would fit 
well with Transport Canada's plan to have Moncton become a cargo hub within the National 
Airports System. However, that would also mean that the Moncton Airport would remain a Tier 
II airport and never have the opportunity to grow to Tier I status (over 1 million passengers a 
year). In addition, as a cargo hub, Moncton would not pose a threat to Halifax. The 
reconstruction work had to be completed by December 1999 - which meant just a little more than 
two years from the date of transfer to go through all of the project management steps, secure 
bridge financing, tendering, technical and geological work that the project would require.   
 
Once again however, the three municipalities came through for the GMAA. The Authority 
secured $4.8 million in funding from the Royal Bank, which was guaranteed by the 
municipalities of Moncton, Dieppe and Riverview. 
 
PCED Vol 9 | Canada’s air transportation policy case study                                                         84 
 
 
Runway 06/24 was completed on time and on budget, and included a new apron which became 
part of the project when Moncton hosted le Sommet de la Francophonie - an international event 
that required the capacity to land large jets. Despite this success, the federal government did not 
seem willing to renegotiate the transfer deal, which by all accounts, was one of the worst deals 
given to any airport in the country. 
 
An article in the Times and Transcript outlined just how unfair that deal has been to the Greater 
Moncton Airport. The article “Deal restricts airport potential" states that the transfer agreement 
“saddled the facility with a $2 million deficit creating an unfair playing field between it (GMA) 
and its counterparts throughout Atlantic Canada.” In fact, an October 2000 report by Auditor 
General, Denis Desautels, confirmed that Moncton got a raw deal in the transfer.  In the report, 
the Auditor General criticized Transport Canada's 'ad hoc' approach to airport privatization 
across the nation, which led to a lack of fairness.  ''The Department could not demonstrate how 
the deals for all the transferred airports were equitable, uniform, consistent and fair with the 
other, as the government has directed'' Mr. Desautels stated in a news release. (Source: Office of 
the Auditor General of Canada and the Commissioner of the Environment and Sustainable 
Development News release October 17, 2000). 
 
In the report he also stated that Transport Canada 'lacked rigour' for having no idea of the fair 
market value of the airport businesses before it negotiated the transfers. Transport Canada 
invested $5.5 million in the Moncton airport in 1997, compared to $9.2 million in Saint John in 
1999 and close to $17 million in Fredericton - $12 million more than Moncton received in 1997. 
Perhaps the most difficult aspect for the region to absorb was that these subsequent deals 
provided unrestricted monies to local authorities up front, allowing them to earn interest on these 
funds while infrastructure improvements were being made. 
 
Other inhibiting factors presented by the Moncton deal included aspects of the land lease 
arrangement with Transport Canada. Again, the airport authority owns the chattels of the airport 
(snowplows, trucks etc.) but does not own the land or buildings, effectively making them the 
guardians of public property. The land-lease arrangement is for 60 years with a 20-year option. 
In addition, the airport authority has to provide NavCan, Customs & Excise and military vehicles 
with free rent and services. 
 
In June 2001, Transport Canada Minister David Collenette was reported to say that the Moncton 
transfer agreement 'deserved a second look.' Although he disagreed with the methodology used 
by the Auditor General, he did send officials to Moncton to review the deal. However, despite 
solid arguments from local officials, the federal government has not reopened the deal – even 
though they promised to do so if it was discovered that the original deal was flawed. 
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Despite these restrictions, since taking over control of the airport in 1997, the Greater Moncton 
Airport Authority has been able to effectively eliminate the $2 million per year operating deficit 
(a modest profit was recorded in 2000), passenger traffic increased from 240,000 in 1997 to a 
projected 450,000 in 2003, and it has attracted new airlines and new services to the facility. 
 
Domestic air policy 
 
Although Atlantic Canada has only seven per cent of Canada's population, it has 25 per cent of 
Canada's NAS airports. This is a direct result of our lower populations and even lower 
percentages of urban-based populations than in other regions of Canada. 
 
Current government policies dealing with the restructuring of Canada's airline industry have 
resulted in problems for most of these airports. Air Canada has enjoyed considerable influence 
with Transport Canada regarding aviation policy and airports. Since the divestiture of airports, 
Air Canada has worked hard to maintain its level of influence over divested airports.  Recent 
events, facilitated by the Federal Government, have given Air Canada a monopoly status in most 
airports in Atlantic Canada. 
 
Monopoly power extends to a significant ability to affect the future economic development 
prospects of a community. For example, the acquisition of Canadian Airlines by Air Canada 
resulted in significant route consolidations, the loss of 40 per cent of daily scheduled passenger 
flights and approximately $600,000 in revenue at the Moncton airport. Under current regulations, 
it can be very difficult for a new entrant to compete directly with Air Canada in the market. As 
well, current regulations place restrictions on U.S. based carriers that preclude them from serving 
our domestic routes, unless they have a code share agreement with Air Canada, limiting their 
trans-border opportunities. However, Air Canada, which has approximately 80 per cent of the 
market, is being closely watched by the Competition Bureau - which is anxious to see airline 
competition in Atlantic Canada. 
 
The competition legislation, which was assented on June 29, 2000, gives the Commissioner of 
Competition a new power to make temporary orders halting anti-competitive acts affecting 
domestic airline services. Due to the dominance of Air Canada in the domestic market, there has 
been a concern about the ability of consumers to obtain a fair price - especially in more isolated 
areas where the routes might be considered less than competitive. 
   
In November 2001, the Bureau came close to shutting down Tango, Air Canada's low cost carrier 
- but Canada 3000 collapsed.  Tango was the coup de grace for Canada 3000, which had earlier 
bought out CanJet; the no-frills airline established to link Atlantic cities with central Canada. 
WestJet Airlines also claims to be the target of a number of initiatives by Air Canada to stifle 
growth and disrupt its success, with the goal to further its dominance of the Canadian airline 
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industry. It also claims that Air Canada's predatory pricing tactics are responsible for putting six 
Canadian airlines out of business. When Air Canada was given approval to acquire Canadian 
Airlines, the government amended federal anti-competitive legislation intending to stop Air 
Canada from driving competition out of the market. 
 
In order to have effective and efficient airline service at a reasonable cost, Transport Canada 
must create a competitive market for air carriers. This involves reducing barriers to entry into the 
Canadian airline market place. It is incumbent on the federal government to encourage and 
promote an environment that fosters competition in the airline industry on an international, trans-
border, national and regional basis.  
 
In Atlantic Canada, competitive air carriers are required to help resolve the air access issues and 
assist in reducing the financial burdens placed on airports. New discount carriers and regional 
U.S. carriers offer the best potential for alternate service in Atlantic Canada. However, to attract 
either of these options, regulatory change is required. 
 
In addition to protection against predatory activity, there must be changes to invite and nurture 
competition by U.S. carriers.  Cabotage rights in Atlantic Canada would allow them to carry 
passengers point-to-point, as well as transborder. This would allow regional U.S. carriers that are 
interlined with major U.S. carriers to offer service that would carry passengers from their 
Canadian point of origin to a U.S. destination on one ticket. This would allow U.S. carriers to 
achieve reasonable loads and offer effective pricing. 
 
In the June 2001, Canada Transportation Act review, the review panel provided a list of 
recommendations in its final report Vision and Balance. In the section, The Airline Industry, 
recommendation 7.1 stated that "the panel recommends the government enter into negotiations 
with the United States and Mexico to create a North American Common Aviation Area in which 
carriers from Canada, U.S. and Mexico would compete freely." Minister Collenette must bring 
this item to the forefront and show leadership in this debate (www.reviewcta-
examenltc.gc.ca/english/pages/ctar-recommendations.htm). 
 
The Atlantic Provinces Chamber of Commerce (APCC) has long been a supporter of open skies 
over North America. The fears expressed by the Minister of Transport, and rhetoric about the 
number of American airlines that began flying into the regions and subsequently pulled out are 
not reasons to move away from open skies but conversely, are reasons to negotiate a more open 
agreement over the continent. 'The fear that our country’s airline industry would suffer from such 
a move is unfounded', contests the APCC. Canadian airlines have been profitable in the past, 
even though they have been restricted in routes and serve a relatively small population base.  
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New England and Atlantic Canada have a history of working together that predates the American 
Revolution and this relationship grows annually as we strive to make the Atlantic Northeast a 
strong region. However, it is not uncommon to hear participants in many of the cross border 
conferences complain ‘you can’t get there from here!’ There is a need for an airline that would 
serve the communities in the Atlantic Provinces and New England and with reciprocal cabotage, 
a strong business case could be made for such an airline.  
 
Despite widespread consultation with stakeholders and plans by the federal government to 
announce further constructive air policy changes, these have not emerged. The anticipated new 
phase of Open Skies with the United States has not been realized.  With the emergence of a 
dominant national carrier, the aftermath of September 11 and the interruption in global economic 
growth, the need to revisit and improve Canada's air policy is clear. 
 
Airport security and the air travellers security charge 
 
When the federal government announced in the 2001 budget that it would take responsibility for 
improved airport security, it was evident that it wanted to provide Canadians with assurances that 
their airports and airplanes would be secure. Over $2.2 billion was allotted for air security 
initiatives and a new Canadian Air Transport Security Authority (CATSA) was created. The 
CATSA would be responsible for the provision of key air security services: pre-boarding 
screening at Canadian airports, deployment of explosive detection equipment; certain airport 
policing services and contracting for armed police on board aircraft. 
 
Other initiatives included providing funding to airlines to help cover costs of security 
modifications to existing aircraft, resulting from new standards and regulations, and hiring new 
inspectors to provide increased oversight of aviation security. However, there was nothing in the 
announcement by the federal government to cover the airport operator's costs associated with 
these new or enhanced security measures. For example, the GMAA was required to hire nine 
new security commissioners, but there was no funding provided to cover salaries for these 
individuals.  
 
The Air Travellers Security Charge that was implemented on April 1, 2002 was considered 
excessive and there appeared to be no link between the fee that air passengers were paying and 
the amount of security that would be provided. The Air Travellers Security Charge was also 
imposed without Transport Canada having conducted any impact analysis on how this change 
would affect the airlines, the travelling public, business travel, the communities and other 
stakeholders. 
 
The Canadian Chamber of Commerce examined the cost side of providing airport security across 
Canada and concluded that required spending in 2002-2003 on airport security would be 
PCED Vol 9 | Canada’s air transportation policy case study                                                         88 
 
 
approximately $223 million, far less than the $430 million dollars budgeted revenue from 
collecting the charge. (Air Travellers Security Charge. Page 135 Canadian Chamber of 
Commerce Policy Positions 2001-2002). Moreover, the federal government budgeted one billion 
dollars over the next five years for the purchase, deployment and operation of advanced 
explosive detection systems at airports across the country. 
 
Security equipment in airports belongs to the Airline Transportation Security Commission, 
which is in turn paid for by air carriers. However, airports are required to provide space and 
security for the machines, adding extra costs to already strained bottom lines. In the opinion of 
the manager of the Moncton Airport ''airports are not considered an integral partner in the airline 
industry as far as security goes.'' Clearly, as key stakeholders, airports should have been part of 
the consultation process. 
 
In 2002, the Canadian Chamber of Commerce made a number of recommendations to the federal 
government including the linking of the Air Travellers Security Charge paid by passengers to the 
level of airport security that is received. They also recommended that the Air Travellers Security 
Charge be set at a level that will provide the required level of security in the long-term but will 
have the least effect on the overall demand for air travel and minimize the impact on smaller 
communities. 
 
On February 28, 2003 John Manley, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Finance, announced 
that the Air Travellers Security Charge would be reduced by more than 40 per cent for air travel 
in Canada as of March 1, 2003. The rate would be reduced to $7 from $12 for one-way travel 
and to $14 from $24 for return flights in Canada for tickets purchased on or after March 1, 2003, 
for flights on or after that date. Tickets purchased before March 1 would be subject to the 
previous rate regardless of when the flight is taken. The $12 rate for travel to the continental 
United States and the $24 rate for other international travel would remain unchanged. While this 
announcement followed up on the Government’s commitment to review the Air Travellers 
Security Charge to ensure revenue remains in line with the overall cost of the enhanced air travel 
security system, once again consideration was not given to the realities that smaller airports face 
nor any differences from region to region. 
 
Capital investments and safety concerns 
 
Canada's air transportation system depends heavily on capital investments to maintain safety and 
efficiency. The airport authorities that manage National System airports are fully responsible for 
capital improvements to their airports. However, they do not qualify to receive public funding for 
capital improvements. Pre-devolution, Transport Canada was paying $135 million annually to 
support the airports system. By 2001 it was collecting over $245 million each year in 'rent' from 
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airport authorities. Although Transport Canada has divested itself of most of its financial 
obligations to small airports, it still has the authority to impose regulations concerning safety. 
 
While there is little doubt that safety is a principal concern of a viable transportation system, 
many of these regulations have significant cost impacts that smaller airports may not have the 
means to meet. For example, the mandatory nature of Canadian Airport Regulation 308 Aircraft 
Emergency Intervention Services poses large cost burdens on small airports and may leave them 
with little scope to pursue other important upgrades such as runway resurfacing and lighting. 
Newly and unsupported regulations such as CAR308 are being imposed without acceptable risk 
analysis and will further jeopardize the future of smaller airports. 
  
In a presentation to the Atlantic Canada Liberal Caucus on May 1, 2003, the Atlantic Canada 
Airports Association expressed concerns that over the next several years, the NAS airports will 
continue to pay rent to the federal government that will inflate to half a billion dollars per year, 
while the effect of the federal government's historical investment in airport infrastructure will 
continue to decline. This has important implications for the air transportation system and must be 
addressed by the federal government. 
 
Bill C-26 and Bill C-27 
 
Bill C-26 enactment amends certain statutes in order to implement specific elements of the 
Policy Framework for Airline Restructuring in Canada of October 26, 1999 and to make a 
consequential amendment. The key elements of the enactment include amendments to the 
Canada Transportation Act authorizing the Governor in Council to approve mergers and 
acquisitions of airline undertakings after review by the Minister of Transport, the Commissioner 
of Competition and the Canadian Transportation Agency; increased authority for the Agency to 
review passenger fares and cargo rates on monopoly routes; authority for the Agency to review 
domestic terms and conditions of carriage; the requirement for notice of exit in cases of major 
passenger seating capacity reductions resulting from discontinuance of services on any domestic 
route; a prohibition of exclusive use clauses in confidential contracts for domestic services. 
 
In May 2003, the Canadian Chamber of Commerce (CCC) submitted its views in response to Bill 
C-26 to the House of Commons Standing Committee on Transport. Page 2, paragraph 3 of their 
presentation points out that the current National Transportation Policy indicates that 
“competition and market forces are, whenever possible, the prime agents in providing viable and 
effective transportation services.” Further, the National Transportation Policy also states that 
“economic regulation of carriers and modes of transportation occurs only in respect of those 
services and regions where regulation is necessary''.  
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Following on this policy, the federal government’s transportation blueprint entitled ‘Straight 
Ahead-A Vision for Transportation in Canada’ advocates less regulation and government 
intervention. They concurred that some of the benefits of deregulation and competition have 
included increased air passenger and air cargo traffic with the U.S. resulting from the 
liberalization of air traffic with the U.S and increased private investment in critical transportation 
infrastructure including, among others, airports. 
 
However, the Canadian Chamber of Commerce opinioned that implementation of Canada’s 
transportation policy has been ad hoc and inconsistent. In many cases, the implementation of this 
policy has not supported the NAFTA trade approach and has not recognized Canada’s 
transportation capacity as an integrated part of a North American economy. As a result, the full 
benefits of a competitive market-based system have yet to be realized, and barriers to growth and 
profitability remain. In conclusion, they submitted that the proposed amendments, intended to 
further regulate the domestic air travel industry, will have a negative impact on the domestic 
airline industry and do not address the critical issues currently facing the industry, such as unfair 
taxation.  
 
Bill C-27, the proposed Canada Airports Act, which received its first reading in the House of 
Commons on March 20th, 2003, will address new and emerging issues as the roles and 
responsibilities of airport authorities are more clearly defined. In addition, a National Airports 
System (NAS) rent policy review will assess the fairness of the current rent policy and its impact 
on the air transportation system. These changes will ensure the efficient and effective operation 
of Canada's NAS airports and will result in a more open and transparent system. 
 
As previously stated, the Greater Moncton Airport Authority (GMAA) currently lives and 
operates under a ground lease that was negotiated with Transport Canada in 1997.  The ground 
lease is approximately eight inches thick and contains sufficient flexibility to operate the airport 
in a commercial manner. The 1994 National Airports Policy that guided the airport transfers had 
a basic premise ''local operation and commercialization of the airports will promote cost-
efficiency and the provision of services matched to user needs.''  However, Bill C-27 severely 
tightens up numerous areas of the ground leases, which in turn severely hampers an airport's 
ability to act in a business or commercial like fashion. 
 
In the opinion of the GMAA, this Act is so prescriptive in nature and so fraught with 
bureaucratic red tape, particularly when it comes to achieving financial self-sustainability, it will 
kill any incentive Airport Authorities might have to develop their airports into economic 
generators for their communities. For example, section 6 (3) of the Act Airport Fees requires that 
airport operators who wish to establish or raise a fee must a) explain how the fee is set and 
describe the purpose for which the revenues from the fees are to be used; b) provide 
opportunities for users and other parties to obtain information about the proposal and express 
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their views about it; c) announce its decision in respect of the proposal after considering the 
views of the users and other parties. 
 
Users and other parties would include the airlines, passengers and members of the community at 
large.  Such a process would be onerous, expensive and time consuming. As a result, many 
airports may simply choose stagnation rather than growth. There is also the danger that 
competition will be stymied through this Act. In addition to regulating the establishment or 
increasing of fees, section 6 establishes charging principles that would disallow differentiation of 
fees among air carriers on the basis of their nationality.  This means that airports could not use 
fee differentiation as a method to provide incentives to attract foreign carriers. In fact, it could be 
argued that, because of this Act, airports will now have to perform as extensions of Transport 
Canada's bureaucracy with little or no incentive to be creative or entrepreneurial; much like the 
days when Transport Canada ran them. As well, the associated costs to do everything required in 
this Act would be significant for small to medium sized airports. 
 
The Atlantic Canada Airports Association sees the Canada Airports Act as a broad-brush attempt 
by the federal government to re-regulate airport administration and management. New levels of 
red tape will force airports to devote more resources to compliance rather than focusing on 
viability and economic stimulation. In letters to Minister Collenette and Joe Comuzzi, MP, Chair 
of the Standing Committee on Transport, the Greater Moncton Chamber of Commerce expressed 
its concerns about the impact that this legislation on the GMAA's ability to respond to local 
needs and the circumstances of our region. The Chamber requested that committee members visit 
the region to see for themselves how much the airport means to local businesses and citizens. As 
well, it requested that the GMAA have the opportunity to appear before the committee to present 
its perspective on the Act and its potential negative impact on the region's economic 
development.  
 
Summary and conclusions 
 
The devolution of Canada's NAS airports to local control has been a success. The transfers were 
negotiated in good faith with local community-based authorities.  Transfers have been successful 
because the community is involved and empowered. Airports have been operated in a business-
like manner and have become instruments for economic development. 
 
The March 12, 2002 strategic economic development plan for the Greater Moncton region 
presented by Grant Thornton to Moncton City Council identified continued development of the 
Greater Moncton International Airport as the ''single most important piece of the economic 
development plan for the Greater Moncton area.'' In addition to direct economic generators such 
as the development of passenger facilities, an Aerospace Park and cargo handling facilities, the 
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airport will facilitate other economic generators including increased investment from the USA 
and further development of the tourism sector (Infrastructure, Pg. 5). 
 
In retrospect, 2002 was a tough year overall for anyone in the aviation industry and it was 
difficult for airlines and airports alike to justify service expansions. However, that being said, the 
Greater Moncton Airport Authority has established aggressive management objectives for 2003 
including identifying new business opportunities, attracting third-party developers to construct a 
common use cargo facility and attracting continental USA transborder services. As well, a 
number of important capital expenditures have been identified for the next five years, including 
the extension of runway 06/24, as this is of particular importance to the expansion of 
cargo/courier services. 
 
To assist the GMAA in achieving these goals and objectives, the federal government should be 
required to review the transfer agreement and ensure that the region's funding is ''equitable, 
uniform, consistent and fair with the others, as the government has directed.''  Further, changes 
should be made to current regulations to ensure that there is competition in the airline industry. 
Competition will encourage new entrants to the market, resolve air access issues, reduce fares, 
increase the numbers of passengers and overall, reduce the financial burdens placed on airports. 
 
While the federal government must have the overall responsibility for safety issues, it should, 
however, be required to consult with all stakeholders, including airport authorities, on all policies 
that modify existing standards or impose new regulations - especially where there is a financial 
impact to the operator. One recommendation from the ACAA is that the Canada Airport Act 
exclude costly compliance for all airports with less than 1 million passengers.  Another suggests 
that the federal government should fully-fund all additional policing and security imposed by 
new regulations. 
  
However, of all these measures, it seems clear that, if passed, Bill C-27: an Act to amend the 
Canada Transportation Act, will have the most profound impact on the way the Greater 
Moncton Airport Authority serves the public, airport users and, most importantly, our local 
community. 
 There are 40 sections where the Minister can impose regulations; 
 There are fundamental changes in the governance rules that give the Minister of 
Transport more unilateral control; 
 The proposed Act seeks to regulate commercial relationship between the airport 
authorities and their clients; 
 Administrative, legal and accounting costs will escalate (perhaps beyond the means of 
smaller airports). 
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The National Airports Policy declaration, item 7 on page 8 of Bill C-27 removes all reference to 
commercialization and instead declares that “it is in the public interest that there be a national 
network of airports that are operated in a manner that is safe, secure, economically sustainable, 
transparent and environmentally responsible.” This is a fundamental change from the original 
NAP principles of commercialization and economic development.  
 
Many communities, including Greater Moncton, are asking why the government is introducing 
this legislation at this time. Since this Act was first conceived and the first draft tabled, many 
new variables have impacted the air transportation industry; the war with Iraq, SARS, higher fuel 
prices and airline casualties around the world, among others. Now is not the time to impose more 
bureaucracy and red tape. It is time to look at the bigger picture. 
 
It is time to look at measures that will enhance rather than hurt the industry and allow the Greater 
Moncton Airport Authority realize its full potential as “the air transportation hub of Atlantic 
Canada for cargo, passengers, and industry, delivering, in partnership with the community, 
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